Nested peripherialisation: remaking the East-West border in the Russian-Estonian borderland by Alena Pfoser (1260054)
Manuscript accepted for publication in East European Politics and Societies (2016) 
 
Nested Peripherialisation: Remaking the East-West Border in the 
Russian-Estonian Borderland  
Alena Pfoser, Loughborough University  
 
 
Abstract  
The break-up of the Cold War order, the eastwards expansion of the European Union into 
former socialist countries and the more recent economic and humanitarian crises have led 
to the emergence of new symbolic borders and the reconfiguration of spatial hierarchies 
within Europe. The article shows how metageographical categories of “Europe”, “East” 
and “West” and underlying classificatory logics are not only circulated in geopolitical 
discourses but can be appropriated by ordinary citizens in their everyday life. Using the 
Russian-Estonian border as a case study, the article examines the recursive negotiations 
of Europe’s East-West border by people living in the borderland as a response to the 
geopolitical changes. It highlights three border narratives – the narrative of becoming 
peripheral/Eastern, the narrative of becoming European, and a narrative contesting the 
East-West hierarchy by associating the East and one's own identity with positive things. 
On both sides of the border, the status as a new periphery does not create unity across the 
border but rather results in multiple and competing border narratives, in which “Europe” 
functions as an unstable referent in relation to which one’s position is marked out. This 
“nested peripherialisation” at Europe's new margins reflects power relations and uneven 
local experiences of transformation.  
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Introduction 
 
The break-up of the Cold War order, the eastwards expansion of the European Union into 
former socialist countries and the more recent economic and humanitarian crises have 
significantly altered the position of Europe “as a place and as an idea”1. While in the 
context of the fading Cold War division, categories like “East” and “West” lost their 
traditional referents2, this did not necessarily result in the creation of a unified European 
continent shaped by principles of cooperation and solidarity and a cosmopolitan outlook, 
as some optimistic commentators believed, but in the reclassification of places and spatial 
relations and a reconfiguration of hierarchies. Merje Kuus3, for example, points out that 
despite the multiple transformations Eastern Europe has undergone since 1989, the East 
continues to be Europe’s negative “other” which is selectively reproduced in geopolitical 
discourses and institutional practices. Rather than a stable location, “Europe” from this 
perspective appears as a flexible constellation, with states sliding in and out of 
Europeanness depending, for example, on how they deal with the past, whether they 
follow political recommendations by European institutions and adopt certain economic 
and democratic principles. Classificatory processes are rooted in unequal power relations, 
however as a significant number of scholars have demonstrated, are neither homogeneous 
nor unidirectional: Eastern European countries are not passive recipients of external 
(Western) classifications but can appropriate metageographical categories to negotiate 
their position within the continent and in relation to their neighbours.4 These processes 
often take a fractal form as dichotomous classifications at European levels recur at 
smaller spatial scales within or between nation-states.5  
Russia and Estonia are particularly interesting cases for studying the remaking of 
Europe's symbolic boundaries because they have been recently divided by the EU 
external border and their border has been characterized as a discursive battlefield shaped 
by polarized imaginations of political space.6 Being situated at Europe’s margins, Russia 
and Estonia have adopted different strategies within these discourses on Europeanness. In 
Estonian public discourses, the border to Russia has been framed as a deep-seated 
civilisational divide between the East and the West. Foregrounding its “European” 
culture and historical heritage, Estonia has framed the fall of the Iron Curtain in terms of 
a “return to Europe”, thus pushing the border of the West further eastwards to include 
herself while making the border with Russia as firm as possible.7 While discussions over 
Estonia’s Northern identity indicate a regionalisation of geopolitical identity they remain 
a secondary geopolitical project in comparison to that of European integration. Although 
often considered Europe's “constitutive other”, Russia too has selectively appropriated 
Europeanness in defining her geopolitical identity and has regularly depicted the Baltics 
as countries of lower civilisation. Russia's relationship to Europe however continues to be 
marked by ambivalence shifting between attempts to achieve European recognition and a 
Russian Sonderweg stressing its cultural distinctiveness.8  
Focusing on how the East-West border is remade and appropriated in vernacular 
narratives in the Russian-Estonian borderland, this article further explores the uneven, 
contested and shifting geographical mappings at Europe’s eastern frontiers. Drawing 
upon narrative interviews with Russian-speakers living in the border towns of Narva, 
Estonia, and Ivangorod, Russia, divided by the EU external border, it examines the 
recursive negotiations and reclassifications of places and spatial relations as the 
borderland undergoes peripheralisation. In doing so, the article foregrounds the 
processual dynamics through which borders are made and remade.9 Authors working in 
the field of border studies have increasingly turned away from stable and functionalistic 
depictions of borders emphasizing their dynamism and multiplicity. Borders are created 
through processes of “bordering, ordering and othering”10, marking a difference between 
here and elsewhere and inscribing it with hierarchical values11. The focus on borders’ 
processual character and multiple determination has been accompanied by a parallel 
reconsideration of the actors of border-making, “disaggregat(ing) the state and the border 
in order to conceptualize the multiple actors and sites of borderwork”12. Chris Rumford, 
in particular, has made the argument for a “vernacularisation of border studies” 13 , 
considering how alongside state actors and political and cultural elites, ordinary citizens 
are increasingly engaged with the business of demarcating and policing borders. Ordinary 
citizens are crucial “actors in the constitution of borders, rarely bringing them into being 
or shifting their location, perhaps (although this is certainly not impossible), but active 
nevertheless in the processes of legitimisation and fixing of borders”14. While Rumford 
focuses on the regulation of mobility and securitization beyond the state and is less 
concerned with the construction of cultural meanings and symbolic character of borders, 
these insights can also be used for studying the symbolic geographies of the East-West 
border. Vernacular narratives and experiences of the negotiation of the East-West border 
have been of relatively little concern in the writing on symbolic geographies, which have 
focused on boundary narratives by politicians, scholars and intellectuals, aiming to 
stabilise territory and naturalise relations between people, culture, and space. 15 
Categories of “Europe”, “East” and “West” are however not only used in geopolitical 
discourses but are also employed by ordinary citizens to make sense of the changes in 
Europe’s border regimes as well as their changing locatedness within it. As I will show, 
making sense of their lives on Europe's new margins, people in the borderland participate 
in the making of symbolic borders and adopt and appropriate metageographical 
categories like “Europe”, “West” and “East” and underlying hierarchical understandings 
in space in their everyday lives.   
Analysing conflicting border narratives, the article not only describes the 
construction of identity and difference on the level of everyday life, as for example in 
Ulrike H. Meinhof’s study16, but also looks at a much wider range of functions that 
border narratives have. Alongside micro-practices of inclusion and exclusion, border 
narratives are used for the articulation of complaints and citizenship claims. This reflects 
more recent work in the field of border studies that have emphasised how the meanings 
and practices of borders constitute acts of citizenships, acts that can have post-national 
characteristics.17  
The article introduces three border narratives that are adopted in Russian-Estonian 
borderland: The narrative of becoming “peripheral”/ “eastern” focuses on the shift from 
being the “West in the East” to becoming eastern and backwards due to the geopolitical 
changes. The second narrative of becoming “European” instead foregrounds the 
emerging differences between both sides and appropriates the East-West hierarchy to 
associate Estonian Narva with a superior identity. In the third narrative, the East-West 
hierarchy is contested by reversing its valences and associating the East with positive 
things. This narrative is largely a response to assumptions about Narva’s and Estonia’s 
Europeanness. I will argue that the multiple ways of bordering in the Russian-Estonian 
borderland constitute the case of a “nested peripherialisation” at Europe's new margins 
that reflect power relations and uneven local experiences of transformation. In an article 
published in 1995, Bakić-Hayden18 introduced the concept of “nesting orientalisms” in 
relation to the example of former Yugoslavia to characterise the gradation of inferiority 
within the East. She showed that assumptions about superiority and inferiority between 
“West” and “East”, “Europe” and “non-Europe” recur within the margins, and labelling 
the other as less developed can be used to veil one's ascribed inferiority. This 
reproduction of the West-East distinction within the oppositional pair resembles 
mathematical fractals and, as Straughn notes, as a counter reaction to negative labelling 
processes it leads to the phenomenon of an eastwards-shifting East.19 In place of Bakić-
Hayden’s “nesting orientalisms” I use “nested peripherialisation” to characterise the 
competing ways of ordering space to foreground the sense that all strategies of narrating 
spatial change are related to the peripherialisation processes that have occurred since 
1991. On both sides of the border the status as a new periphery does not create unity 
across the border but results in parallel and competing projects of imagining space and 
constructing difference – making claims about one's superior status vis-a-vis the other or 
using assumptions about one's inferiority and Easternness to argue for symbolic 
recognition and financial benefits. In particular, people's locatedness on one or the other 
side of the border and the differing national trajectories and the dynamics of inclusion 
and exclusion in Europe shape the how the East-West border is continuously made and 
remade on the ground.  
 
Narva and Ivangorod: Shifting Symbolic and Material Landscapes 
 
Within the polarised symbolic geographies between Estonia and Russia, the twin towns 
of Narva and Ivangorod on the Narova River form a terrain of ambivalent and 
contentious allegiances to East and West. In the past, Narva and Ivangorod experienced 
changing sovereignties under Danish, Livonian, Swedish and Russian rule and have 
therefore often been regarded as comprising a contested borderland between 
Protestantism and Orthodox faiths, “Western” or Russian influence. Despite the changing 
political rulers, the border towns of Narva and Ivangorod belonged to the same state since 
the mid-16th century and developed as an integrated settlement, with the smaller 
Ivangorod forming a suburb of larger Narva.20 When Estonia gained its independence in 
1920, the two towns remained united as in the Tartu Peace treaty demarcated the border 
10 km to the east of Narva.21 Only after World War II, following Estonia’s incorporation 
into the Soviet Union in 1944, was the border redrawn by Stalin using the Narova River 
as a line of division. The internal border between the Russian and the Estonian Socialist 
Soviet Republics formed an administrative division; Narva and Ivangorod had separate 
town halls, and important political decisions had to be made via Tallinn or Leningrad 
respectively. The border however did not hinder the towns from effectively forming an 
integrated settlement; over the years they developed a common labour market, public 
transportation system, infrastructural facilities as well as a unified water supply and 
canalisation. Despite some symbolic differences – it was considered to be more prestigious 
to live in Estonian Narva, for example – the sense of a shared space was constitutive of 
everyday life; the Russian-speaking population who moved to the borderland as part of 
the Soviet industrialisation programme and replaced its earlier multi-ethnic population, 
visited friends and relatives across the border, attended cultural events and buried their 
loved ones on the other side.22 Since the restoration of Estonia's independence in 1991, 
the integrated border space has been socially and spatially transformed by the national 
logics and the economic changes happening with the transition to capitalism.23 Local 
elites have started attempts at nationalising the borderlands, thereby marking the border as 
a dividing line between states and civilisations and selectively mobilising historical 
memory to reinforce the division.24 On the level of everyday life, the hardening border 
regime had a great impact on the lives of the local population and created much 
frustration on both sides of the border. Alongside other turbulences of the transition, the 
negative impact of deindustrialisation and the status loss that Russian-speakers in Estonia 
experienced after the restoration of independence, many people had to rearrange their 
trans-border family relations, change schools, sell their dachas on the other side, find new 
jobs. In 1992 Estonia established a visa regime with Russia but first introduced a propusk 
system for locals with relatives on the other side to mitigate some of the negative 
consequences of the border drawing for the borderland. The simplified border-crossing 
regime was abolished in 2000 because of Estonia’s approaching EU membership. Despite 
the bureaucratisation of the border-crossing, new forms of border-related interactions and 
experiences have emerged since the early 1990s that use the border as a resource in 
combatting shifting regimes of value.   
Examining local negotiations of the changing border regime, the article draws on 
several months of fieldwork in the borderland between 2010 and 2012 and 58 life-story 
interviews with people living on both sides of the border. The interviews were semi-
structured with large narrative part, focusing on different aspects of life and perceptions of 
place in the borderland.25  
 
“Here Is Where Russia Ends”: Becoming a Periphery  
 
Iuliia, a retired factory worker, had experienced the changes in the border regime 
particularly intensely. The border ran directly through her family – she was based in 
Ivangorod, her husband in Narva – and the increasing regulations and queues at the 
border crossing constituted a violent intrusion into her personal life. Our interview 
formed for Iiulia a platform to articulate her demands for local cross-border mobility but 
also to make more general complaints about the lack of care for their predicament by the 
Russian state:  
As far as I know in the whole world everybody who lives in a border town 
receives some subsidies. Additional work places are created so that people 
can live comfortably. Here they only take from us, everything is only 
getting worse and worse. (…) There are no positive incentives so that we 
could feel that we are representatives of Great Russia, that here is where 
Russia begins. Here is where Russia ends; this is how it turns out.26  
Iuliia’s expression “this is where Russia ends” was emblematic for the changes the 
Russian-Estonian borderland has gone through in the past decades, from being the Soviet 
Union’s western borderland to becoming a national periphery. During Soviet rule the 
industrial region around Narva and Ivangorod was considered economically and 
culturally more advanced than other parts of the Soviet Union due to its distinct historical 
heritage and developed consumer culture. The fall of socialism, the decline of the local 
industries and cutting off of relations however turned the once lively social and economic 
cross-border space into what one participant characterised as an “appendix”, a useless 
and remote place without a future. The narrative of peripherialisation was based on 
assumptions about the reconfiguration of space from being the “West of the East” in the 
past to becoming eastern and relatively backwards, and was based on a self-description as 
an inferior East. It was adopted both in Ivangorod and Narva, with mirroring assumptions 
of one’s own inferiority and related sentiments (nostalgia about the past, indignation or 
resignation about the present). Elderly people who had own experiences of life under 
socialism and those who had had difficulties in adapting to the changes contrasted their 
memories of past wealth and well-being to an alienating present. Becoming “peripheral” 
or “eastern” was not, however, a uniform or unifying narrative. Rather, “eastern 
peripherality” was experienced differently on both sides of the border and reflected 
locally specific idioms of marginality shaped by different national trajectories.  
  
<insert Picture 1 here> Picture 1: Street on the Parusinka Peninsula, Ivangorod 
(author’s photo, November 2011) 
 
Andrei, a retired engineer and active chess player, lived in a small flat on the Parusinka 
island in Ivangorod, a 19th century industrial zone now constituting a particularly desolate 
part of the town (cf. Picture) with crumbled asphalt streets and buildings. Looking out of 
the window from his kitchen, Andrei reflected on the town’s changing status and his own 
difficulties of making a living in the present since the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
How many destroyed houses do you see if you go for a walk on the 
Parusinka? There used to be a wonderful restaurant with an interesting 
interior design at the final bus station. On the other side there was a 
restaurant and a shop. In the factory thousand people used to work and 
now maybe a hundred are left. Can you see the red house with the letter 
“P’”? [Andrei pointed to an uncompleted structure] A structure for a 
military institute was built there that should be moved to Ivangorod from 
Krasnoe Selo. But then this unfortunate time happened… I don’t have 
words to describe what is happening now.27 
The empty and demolished buildings and idle factories of the Parusinka formed in 
Andrei’s eyes, spatial signs of economic and social decline. The privatisation and 
movement of production sites elsewhere had left behind a transformed urban space in 
which together with the industrial work, local infrastructure, commerce and leisure 
activities had been closed down. Andrei linked his observations to a more general 
reflection on Ivangorod’s locatedness within Russia:  
Putin and Medvedev are people with common sense but they can’t bring 
any order, you know. They care about stability in Russia, and therefore 
they have to be in power, and to be in power they have to feed the 
metropolis with millions of voters. Then they will have the majority in the 
Duma. But we, the province, a remote place (zakholust’e) we don’t see 
these changes. There, they move to new flats but here this house is the 
newest one.  
While for Andrei the fall of socialism was the main reason for Ivangorod’s peripherality, 
in his narrative it was interpreted not only in terms of relations between past and present 
but also in terms spatial relations – as a result of the spatial inequalities between the 
centre (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and the periphery. Although some of my 
interlocutors valued “life in the provinces” because of the peacefulness and nature, a 
sense of being left out of the relative progress happening in the administrative and 
cultural centres was dominant: “nobody needs us… it is as if we don’t exist”, as Iuliia put 
it. Ivangorod had been cut off from its larger sister Narva, and due to “hyper-centric 
hierarchical structure of the Russian state”28 with a concentration of capital, power and 
signs of a capitalist modernity in its two metropolises it now formed a remote place 
despite its relative geographical proximity to St. Petersburg.  
Deindustrialisation had also affected economic and social life in Estonian Narva, 
but in contrast to Ivangorod, the peripheralisation process had an additional ethnic 
dimension, reflecting the different national contexts of the transformation: becoming 
peripheral was also interpreted as a result of an ethnic nationalisation directed against 
Narva’s Russian-speaking population. A number of policies were adopted in the 1990s to 
restore national independence and sovereignty after Soviet rule. These policies privileged 
ethnic Estonians and others who could trace their roots back to the First Estonian 
Republic and disempowered Russian-speaking Soviet-era migrants who were perceived 
as occupants or colonists. 29 Being deprived of automatic membership in the national 
community, Russian-speakers in Narva felt doubly marginal – excluded both inhabitants 
of a peripheral post-industrial place and because of their ethnic origin. Mariia, like 
Andrei a retired engineer, foregrounded the role of “national consciousness” and the 
national construction of a Russian threat in the peripheralisation process. 
During the Soviet times not everything was as bad as they try to imagine it 
now. There were a lot of things which were much better… I do understand 
the national consciousness but like this, it was without grounds. How did it 
turn out? Everything was destroyed and now? (…) now this is a 
downtrodden district… Why was it done this way? Why? Can it really be 
that … they are afraid of Russia and therefore they stain the image of all 
Russians living here? One should not do this.30  
Rather than “escaping the east” and “returning to Europe” – a narrative commonly 
mobilised to frame the transition in a positive way – many of Narva’s Russian-speakers 
saw themselves as turned into “easterners” by the reconfiguration of Europe’s borders 
and the logics of the nationalistic and capitalist transformation that accompanied it. 
Despite shared imaginations of an inferior status, narratives of peripherialisation drew 
upon diverging experiences and positionalities in Narva and Ivangorod and hardly 
created an imagination of a common space transcending national borders. As a relational 
category “peripheriality” was bound to a centre; it was used to define one's place as an 
internal other within the new national and global geographies. Inhabitants looked inwards 
from the margins and rarely across the border and articulated claims in relation to their 
own state as part of their narrative of peripherialisation, demanding state care, financial 
subsidies and recognition as well as the easing of the border regime. In the statement 
quoted earlier, Iuliia complained that Ivangorod ought to be Russia’s gate and an 
embodiment of its greatness. Based on imaginations of how a border town should look 
like she made use of Ivangorod’s locatedness to articulate her expectations of a better 
life. Narratives of peripheralisation thus were based on a reinstatement of inferiority – of 
having become an internal periphery – and simultaneously, a wish to escape it.  
 
“Becoming European”: Negotiating Local Differences  
Despite the economic and financial crises and internal divisions, the category of 
“Europe” is a largely positive trope in the making of symbolic geographies in post-
socialist countries and often continues to be associated with economic progress and 
cultural superiority. In Estonia, the narrative of a “return to Europe” after 1991 has been 
prominent in Estonia’s political discourse to mark one’s belonging to a superior cultural 
space and historical trajectory. In contrast to the topos of a “lost modernity” articulated in 
the narrative of peripherialisation and the self-description as inferior and internal other, 
the category of “Europe” was also adopted locally make sense of different trajectories 
and economic inequalities within the borderland. Narva has seen changes in urban space 
since the late 1990s: streets have been refurbished, several cafes were opened and also 
shopping malls have been erected, including cafes and restaurants, a cinema and shops 
with Western brands. These changes created an image of urban renewal despite the 
difficult economic situation, which was missing in Ivangorod. Drawing upon the 
emerging local differences between the sides, uneven national trajectories and older 
symbolic boundaries in the region, several respondents on both sides of the border 
interpreted the changes in Narva as westernisation, a spatiotemporal rapprochement to 
Europe.  
 
<insert Picture 2 here> Picture 2: Shopping Centre “Fama Keskus”, Narva (author’s 
photo, Sept 2011) 
 
At the end of the interviews, I usually showed my respondents several pictures of 
characteristic sites in the borderland to elicit place-specific memories and meanings. 
When I showed Elena, a student at the local college, the picture of Fama Keskus, a 
recently opened shopping center in Narva, she said decisively: “This is already Europe. 
Hello, hello Europe!” Then she commented on other images of the closed textile 
manufacturing plant “Krenholm” and the “friendship bridge” between Narva and 
Ivangorod, both symbols of Soviet Narva:  
This is what Narva was. Beautiful, mostly beautiful. The Krenholm 
factory, the friendship [bridge] and …[pointing to the picture with the 
shopping centre] this is already Europe! With all brands, trends, Ray Bans 
– look, Germany is everywhere! It is good that we are starting to find a 
way out (vyrulivat’). Maybe the salaries will be like in Germany 
sometime.31  
Growing up in a working class family constantly lacking money, Elena embraced 
everything she considered European and was very conscious in her attempts to achieve 
what she called a “decent life” – primarily reflected in her consumer desires. As Daphne 
Berdahl notes, consumption works as “a central organizing category and metaphor for the 
dynamics of East-West relations”,32 and also for Elena it was mainly by spending her 
time in the local shopping centre and demonstrating her awareness of brands that she 
associated herself with “European” places and expressed her ambitions for a better life. In 
her brief comments on the photographs I presented, Elena describe the coexistence of 
different places within Narva, assigning them to different times. “Europeanness”, used to 
characterise the shopping center, has a positive connotation and is linked to a specific 
imagination of modernity and consumerism that coexists with other inferior places and 
times that symbolise industrial work and Narva’s connection to Russian Ivangorod. 
Elena’s narrative was shaped by a hierarchical ordering of spaces in which an imagined 
“West” served as a model and in which Tallinn ranked higher than Narva, and Germany 
higher than Estonia. Narva was not completely European but on the way of becoming it. 
These nesting place identities were particularly important to mark a difference to 
neighbouring Ivangorod and Russia. According to her, what set Narva and its population 
apart were not only socioeconomic but also cultural differences based on different 
imaginations of a “normal life” and consumer desires, or, to put it differently, it was the 
will to “escape the east” and the rejection of the values associated with it which made her 
superior to her neighbours.  
While younger people like Elena usually focused on socioeconomic differences 
between Narva and Ivangorod and saw Europeanness as a positive departure from the 
Soviet past, the formation of cultural differences between Russians living in Russia and 
Estonia was evoked across generational divides, drawing upon long-established symbolic 
boundaries in the region. Particularly older participants rooted Estonia's European 
character in experiences of the Soviet period. People who had moved to Narva from other 
Soviet Republics referred to an adaptation process through which they had become more 
“Estonian” or “European”, speaking differently, becoming quieter and more ordered and 
generally more cultured.33 The narrative of “becoming European” adopted elements of 
the elite discourse – the assumption of Estonia's cultural and economic superiority vis-à-
vis Russia and Russian-speakers – while at the same time appropriating it to serve 
different purposes. Framing themselves as “European” was a way of constructing 
belonging to a superior economic and geocultural space and marking a difference vis-à-
vis Russia. Through this narrative Russian-speakers who were usually seen as non-
European inserted themselves into the symbolic geographies of Europe and countered 
constructions of “otherness” within Estonia.  
Narratives of “becoming European” functioned not only as a self-description in 
Narva but were also used in Ivangorod attributing a higher status to the other side and by 
implication accepting an inferior, non-European status for oneself. Assumptions about the 
other’s superiority in this case were a means of expressing higher individual aspirations 
and on the collective level were linked to claims-making. Ivan, a young engineer, recalled 
that he was shocked when he went to Narva for the first time, almost 20 years after the 
erection of the passport controls: “You cross the river and there is a different town, a 
different country”. In contrast to the stagnating town of Ivangorod, “there is a cinema, 
chain of shops… or rather the quantity of shops… there is some choice”34. Vera, who 
worked in the town administration, made a similar observation stressing the sensual, 
legal, cultural and economic characteristics that made Narva distinct from Ivangorod: 
When I cross over to Narva and enter a building or something else, well I 
go and say that it even smells (differently) (…) this is already a part of 
what makes Narva different, and there are different rules, although 
Russians inhabit large sections of the city, anyhow, you feel that this is 
already Europe. The way everything is organised, I don't know why but 
when you go and take a taxi you have to use the seatbelt (…) and in regard 
to the shops there have been already such supermarkets opened and you go 
there and they are European, unlike ours.35  
For some inhabitants of Ivangorod the access to a locally experienced Europe (through 
the access to leisure activities and shopping) added to their place experience and made 
life in Ivangorod more interesting. By acknowledging their neighbour’s Europeanness 
their own peripheral situation became less of a burden and almost achieved an elevated 
status because they were close to (European) Narva and everything it offered. Others, 
however, used the local differences to complain about the situation in Ivangorod and to 
reinforce the argument about Ivangorod’s need for development. Ivan said that he was so 
frustrated with the lack of development that he had taken steps to prepare his relocation 
to Narva – he attended an Estonian language course and registered himself in Narva – to 
increase his personal opportunities, which he saw easier to realise in “Europe”.  
Perhaps the most radical assertion of Estonia’s superiority came, however, in a 
petition initiated by the City Council Deputy Iurii Gordeev in 2010 that demanded 
Ivangorod’s annexation to Estonia and was signed by over five per cent of Ivangorod’s 
population. It followed an earlier petition from 1998 and was at least partly a response to 
the downsizing of the local budget due to administrative restructuring. In 2007, 
Ivangorod had lost its regional autonomy and as a consequence lost 50 million roubles. 
This administrative change reinforced the local decline and dramatically affected 
possibilities for public investments. Responding to this situation, the petition launched in 
2010 declared that “the arbitrary rule of our bureaucrats as well as the absolute 
indifference of the regional powers regarding our problems forced out to take this step”.36 
As it was stated by the initiator himself in multiple interviews, rather than questioning the 
territorial integrity of the Russian state from within, the petition should be interpreted as a 
deliberate provocation to raise awareness of the local situation. One of its signatories 
explained its purpose in the following way:  
I would be for giving Ivangorod to Narva, so that we could at least have 
what they have there. If you come from Narva to Ivangorod you can feel 
the difference, right? You feel it. (…) Of course, Russia would never give 
up Ivangorod – this is all too clear. (…) Okay, so don’t give it up. But then 
at least put things straight in Ivangorod… You shouldn't treat a town like 
this!37  
By contrasting Ivangorod to Narva and demanding a shift of the border eastwards to 
include oneself into a more privileged space, claims for state care are underlined. At the 
same time, speakers mobilise images of a socioeconomic border between Narva and 
Ivangorod.  
 Reversing the East-West Hierarchy  
 
Several of the interview excerpts demonstrate the circulation of the rhetoric of Central 
and Eastern Europe’s inferiority and otherness in the borderland as a result of Europe’s 
shifting borders and the economic decline and symbolic marginalisation. The rhetoric of 
inferiority, asserting the lack of markers of modernity such as successful market 
economies and democracies following the Western European model, is commonly used 
within the region. 38  In the border narratives discussed above claims about one’s 
inferiority function not only in terms of a self-critique but as a rhetorical device to 
articulate demands and asserting political actorhood.39 Reinstating the East-West border 
and positioning oneself outside of Europe in this case serves as a weapon of the weak to 
draw attention to one’s deservingness. Easternness can however be used in yet another 
way: as a means to express positive belonging and to mark one’s membership in a 
community by reversing the valences of the East-West hierarchy and associating 
“Easternness” with positive things. 40  Focusing on expressions of provinciality and 
otherness in Lithuania, Neringa Klumbyte emphasises how Easternness becomes a “local 
asset” and marker of “a positive national ideology” 41  based on a reevaluation of 
otherwise marginalised identities, tastes and desires 42 . This alternative, positive 
conception of Easterness has a long history in Russia, and Prozorov 43  shows in an 
analysis of political discourses in Russia how it is currently linked to the reassertion of 
Russia as a sovereign state: the felt exclusion from Europe has led to the replacing of 
European-centered national identity constructions with anti-European ones.  
In the Russian-Estonian borderland we can observe similar dynamics; as a 
response to Narva’s Europeanisation and feelings of exclusion resulting from it, people 
living in Ivangorod reversed the valences associated with the East-West border. While 
acknowledging Narva's more advanced socioeconomic and technological development, it 
was evaluated as negative change that destroyed social relations. Aleksandr, a shop 
owner who had grown up in Narva and had taken up work in a factory in Ivangorod after 
completing his studies in 1988, was among those who criticised the emerging differences 
between the border towns. Aleksandr remembered his Soviet childhood in the borderland 
with nostalgia: 
The Soviet memories are much more sincere than now. When you go to 
Narva… I don't experience Narva as European, Europeanized. I just walk 
through the backyards and notice how everything has changed, how even 
the walls are unfriendly… Russian people, who live in Narva tell us, the 
Ivangorod people, that... “Excuse me, we are Estonians”. I say: “You are 
Russian. How can you [say you’re Estonian] because of such a 
nonsense...?” How is this possible? Why is there such a division... That 
they are in Narva, they are in Estonia, in Europe. They think “we are one 
step higher than you, and you are ... who are you at all?” That means there 
is such a division in consciousness which has happened here.44  
Aleksandr’s statement conveys a sense of a difference and estrangement that he 
contrasted with the shared past of his childhood. He nostalgically remembered the times 
of unity and mobilised a shared ethnic identity across borders, and criticised how both 
materially and mentally Narva had turned away from Ivangorod and its inhabitants now 
thought of themselves as superior than their eastern neighbours. Aleksandr himself 
rejected the use of the category of Europeanness for Narva because of the hierarchy 
between the sides that it implied. However, complaining about Narva’s (Western) 
arrogance and re-evaluing his relation to Narva, he himself participated in bordering 
processes: he said that due to his negative encounters, he had stopped visiting Narva “I 
wouldn’t even take Narva as a gift”. Particularly the commercialisation of the relations to 
Narva were criticised, as Narva's inhabitants were said to have turned from friends and 
neighbours into arrogant costumers who just come to buy cigarettes and leave. 
Refusing to visit Narva and/ or refusing the character traits associated with it, 
residents of Ivangorod reproduced the border through practices of self-exclusion. 
Negotiating their own locatedness outside of “Europe” or the “European Union”, some of 
my respondents positively valued Russian collectivism vs Western individualism, 
disorder vs strictness, solidarity vs competition – for example when contrasting the cold 
consumerism of the other side to the good neighbourly relations in Ivangorod. When I 
asked Iuliia, whether she would like to move in with her husband in Narva, she said:  
I was born in Narva, it is my home [moia rodina]. But now, I don’t want 
[to go there] anymore. I tell you why. I have an Estonian mobile phone 
connection and a phone with a Russian mobile phone connection. And 
then there is still the Ivangorod phone connection: when you have little 
money you call through the window. Plus I can still go to my neighbours 
and say “Listen, I am very hungry, I don’t have anything at home, please 
feed me!” well this is possible here, but not anymore in Narva, there is 
“Europe”. It hardly ever happens. But this is such a good thing!45  
Local networks of support and exchange in Ivangorod characterised by neighbourliness 
and mutual help are contrasted to a “Europeanized” Narva where people presumably have 
more distanced relationships. Interestingly, the practices of support emerge out of a 
situation of need – experiencing financial shortage or lack of certain goods – but in this 
case have positive connotations as they are linked to constructions of community and 
solidarity which get lost with the European modernity. A response to uneven post-
socialist change, the reversal of the East-West hierarchy in the case of Ivangorod is a way 
of dealing with disappointments and attendant feelings of inferiority. Rather than aiming 
to “catch up” and become more similar, characteristics associated with the “East” are 
embraced and are used to mobilise a positive sense of local and national belonging. 
Although the valences of the East-West hierarchy are reversed, the refusal of Western 
superiority is similar to the previous narratives in that, first, it does not question the 
essentialist character traits associated with both geopolitical poles and, secondly, shares 
the similar sets of characteristics assigned to East and West, e.g. development vs 
backwardness, rationality vs emotionality. This reflects, as Lewis and Wigen note in their 
discussion on symbolic borders between East and West, “a remarkable congruence in the 
contours of their respective cultural stereotypes.”46 
 
Conclusion  
 
The examples I have used provide some insights into how people living on Europe's new 
margins make sense of Europe's shifting geographies and negotiate their locatedness 
within them, drawing on diverse objects, practices and values (like for example, 
abandoned buildings, consumption practices and ideas about living together). The 
interviews clearly show a sense of difference, which has emerged in the once integrated 
and ethnically relatively homogeneous border space. Most of the borderlanders had 
initially perceived the border with its material manifestations and increasing regulations 
as something, which was imposed from above; however, in making sense of their 
position at the margins and within a hierarchically structured system of spatial divisions, 
they participated in making it stick.  
Within the multiple configurations of the East-West dyad, competing 
imaginations of modernity and civilizational progress served as the lenses through which 
advantages of being “western” or “eastern” were discussed. The narrative of becoming 
peripheral focused on the experience of socioeconomic decline within the new 
geographies and used assumptions about one's backwardness and lost Soviet modernity 
for claims making. The other two narratives identified in the article, the narrative of 
becoming European and a narrative contesting the East-West hierarchy, emphasised the 
local production of differences. Adopting the East-West hierarchy, Russian-speakers 
living in Estonian Narva constructed themselves as more European than their Russian 
neighbours, thus marking (and reclaiming) belonging to a superior space. People living in 
Ivangorod shared similar assumptions about Narva’s Europeanness to express their own 
backwardness and need for development. The counter-narrative to this Europeanisation 
and the exclusion it produced for Ivangorod was to reverse the East-West hierarchy and 
to associate one's side with positive connotations. The East in this case was not a negative 
ascription and a place to escape but was embraced as a better alternative to Europe’s 
individualism and rationality. 
Rather than questioning the East-West divide and mobilising cross-border 
spatialities, all three narratives reaffirm and reproduce spatial differences – although the 
valences and people's own position within this hierarchy diverge. Even the narrative of 
“becoming peripheral” which at least potentially could be appear as a shared narrative 
between the sides was bound to an imagination of being divided from each other, 
positioned at the “edge” of respective national geographies. This does not mean that the 
borderland was purified of alternative spatialities, familiar landscapes of cross-border 
friendships, work and leisure. However, what one could observe here is a reconfiguration 
of these relations: as people tried to make sense of the geopolitical changes, they adopted 
the East-West distinction, invested it with local meanings and appropriated it for claim-
making.  
The narratives make clear that the East-West hierarchy is not only defined in 
geopolitical discourses at the European level but also recurs at smaller spatial scales as 
rank differences are reproduced and negotiated within the periphery. As powerful 
classifications about places and people are made at the European level in the aftermath of 
the financial and economic crises, peripheries do not necessarily form sites in which 
spatial hierarchies and border narratives are resisted but are themselves involved in 
classificatory struggles over Europeanness, its location and content, drawing upon 
metageographical categories and cultural assumptions embedded in them as cultural 
resources to articulate claims and frame one's experience of Europe’s shifting 
geographies. Rather than marking a clear line between Europe’s inside and outside, the 
EU external frontier is better conceptualised as a field of multiple and competing border 
narratives, in which “Europe” functions as an unstable referent in relation to which one’s 
own position is marked out. As Klumbyte writes, the process of Europeanisation is a 
“contested and fragmentary cultural process that exists through its various local 
rearticulations”47, something that becomes particularly apparent at its margins. The case 
of Narva and Ivangorod is distinct in that the borderland is ethnically relatively 
homogeneous, and Russian-speakers living in Narva use the East-West dichotomy not 
only in relation to their cross-border neighbours but also to negotiate their status as an 
ethnic minority and internal “other” within Estonia. Claiming “Europeanness” in this 
context means not only to differentiate themselves from Russia but also to claim 
belonging within Estonia and the EU. Furthermore, the self-exclusion from Europeanness 
in Russian Ivangorod can be seen as part of the reassertion of Russian national identity as 
distinct from and opposed to Europe.  
On a general level, the article demonstrates both the relevance and openness of 
“Europe” as a classificatory label at Europe’s margins: it shows the difficulty of escaping 
these East-West oppositions in a context where economic asymmetries, the politics of 
nation-building and EU border enforcement have immediate reverberations in everyday 
lives and create a need to reevaluate places and identities. Classificatory schemes help to 
make sense of experiences and imaginations of difference and exclusion and allow people 
to express hopes, aspirations and disappointments, acquiring localised meanings. 
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